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 #SQUADGOALS: A RESPONSE TO SETH WAXMAN 
AMELIA SMITH RINEHART1 
Former Solicitor General Seth Waxman’s recent remarks, framing our 
current age of patent law in the Supreme Court as “interesting times,” un-
questionably captures the exhilaration of an active Supreme Court in this 
area of the law.2 Waxman knows his way around patent cases decided by the 
Supreme Court—he presented arguments in four of the six patent cases in 
the 2016 Term3—but he also has an extensive appellate practice before the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”), which has ex-
clusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases.4 Given his substantial expe-
rience in patent appellate litigation, Waxman is a reliable observer of patent 
law and practice over the years, especially in the Supreme Court. 
In his remarks, he suggests that the Supreme Court’s “attention to pa-
tents”5 of late has been marked by an increase in the number of cases that it 
selects for its docket, by the tendency of such cases to foster uncertainty, by 
the lack of robust dissent in its unanimous patent cases, and by its discon-
nection of meaningful context from the Federal Circuit, Congress, or lower 
courts from its decisions.6 The result, he claims, is a level of uncertainty par-
ticularly poisonous to patent law because of its utilitarian nature, where the 
entirety of the scheme is premised on investment ex ante.7 Fearing that this 
attention will continue “for the foreseeable future,” Waxman proposes that 
the Court pause its patent agenda and proceed cautiously to avoid unraveling 
more incentives for innovation.8 
 
 1.  Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, S. J. Quinney 
College of Law, the University of Utah. Many thanks to Paul Gugliuzza, Cathy Hwang, RonNell Ander-
sen Jones, and Marc Rinehart for helpful suggestions and insight, and to Brandon Fuller and Carlos Qui-
jada for research assistance. This research was made possible, in part, through generous support from the 
Albert and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence. Any errors are my own. 
 2.  See generally Seth P. Waxman, May You Live In Interesting Times: Patent Law In The Supreme 
Court, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 214 (2017).  
 3.  Paul R. Gugliuzza, How Much Has the Supreme Court Changed Patent Law?, 16 CHI.-KENT 
J. INTELL. PROP. 330, 333 (2017). 
 4.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2009).  
 5.  Waxman, supra note 2, at 216. 
 6.  Waxman, supra note 2, passim.  
 7.  Waxman, supra note 2, at 225. 
 8.  Waxman, supra note 2, at 225. 
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Waxman leaves it to the reader to conclude whether these times are a 
blessing or a curse, but his account of the past decade’s “trends and themes” 
strikes a Chicken Little tone while highlighting a frenetic pace, substantial 
changes, uncertainty, skepticism, lopsidedness, and devaluation.9 In this re-
sponse, I propose a more optimistic view. The problems that Waxman wor-
ries over are actually inherent to some of patent law’s values, in good and 
bad ways, which will keep the times interesting. In exploring some of his 
themes below, I lean on baseball and popular neuroscience to reframe these 
conflicting values positively. In doing so, I propose recasting the institutional 
players in patent law, including the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 
as cooperative rivals that render the patent system more robust (and, indeed, 
interesting) for our times. 
I. ON CARDOZO, PERPLEXED RATS, & BASEBALL 
When Waxman describes the heart of patent law as “about achieving 
balance,” he summarizes two hundred and twenty-eight years (and counting) 
of the United States patent system in operation.10 The system rewards a pri-
vate actor with limited exclusive rights (backed by our federal courts) in ex-
change for the disclosure of inventions into the public sphere.11 These rights 
to exclude are presumably valuable, at least to some private actors,12 and our 
methods of achieving balance—between the public progress the system in-
tends to promote and the cost of exclusion in the form of administration and 
reduced competition—center around how inventors obtain patents in the first 
place and enforce them against infringers, although enforcement actions in 
 
 9.  In the classic folktale, Chicken Little believes the world is ending when an acorn falls on her 
head. See, e.g., GEORGE BRIDGE & BEA MORITZ, CHICKEN LITTLE (2017).  
 10.  See generally Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (1790); see also Mayo Collaborative 
Serv. v. Prometheus Lab., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 92 (2012) (describing patent protection as a two-edged 
sword, where private exclusive rights incentivize but also carry costs of exclusion, including reduced 
competition); Waxman, supra note 2, at 219.   
 11.  For a summary of competing theories as to what exactly patents are meant to incentivize, see 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024 (1989). See also DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS 
AND HOW COURTS CAN FIX IT 68–78 (describing basic theory as an exchange of investment in research 
and development for exclusive rights). Courts typically consider disclosure of the invention the primary 
goal of the patent system. See, e.g., Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 247 (1832) (describing the patent 
disclosure as “the foundation of the power to issue the patent”).  
 12.  Bessen and Meurer describe how different industries value (and use) patents differently. JAMES 
BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT 
INNOVATORS AT RISK 144–45 (2008). One notable modern example of patent rights being offered freely, 
Elon Musk, the chief executive officer of Tesla Motors, Inc., who has promised not to enforce his patents 
against anyone willing to follow Tesla’s good faith guidelines. Musk’s other company, SpaceX, has “vir-
tually no patents.” Jerry Hirshi & Tiffany Hsu, Musk Offers Tesla Patents To All, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 
2014, at A1. 
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the courts raise questions of validity alongside liability ones. Free competi-
tion and technological progress, thus, present two important ideas always in 
some tension when considering patent policy.13 
Waxman raises another important value in his remarks: certainty.14 The 
quid pro quo of the patent system requires that an erstwhile inventor 
(whether a person or a company) invests in research and development with 
the hopes eventually that she will succeed in reducing an invention to prac-
tice, that she will obtain a patent sufficiently broad to give her the right to 
exclude others from competing with her invention in the marketplace, and 
that she will reap the benefits of such exclusion either through revenue from 
commercialization partners like licensees or from manufacturing and sales.15 
This premise suggests that quick and substantive changes in the law will ren-
der these rights to exclude less predictable and, accordingly, less valuable. 
As a result, our inventor will have less and less incentive to engage in the 
expensive upfront R&D. 
But Waxman is not alone in asking whether we are doing enough by 
way of certainty in the law generally. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, after de-
scribing law as continually being pulled in the different directions of stability 
and progress, wrote, “The subject has a literature that takes us back to Aris-
totle and earlier.”16 Cardozo joined his successor on the Court, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, in viewing law as “a science of prediction par excel-
lence”17—‘The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing 
more pretention,’ says Holmes, ‘are what I mean by the law.’”18 As such, in 
order to grow, the law must avoid two extremes: fixation and immutability, 
on the one hand, and an “isolated doom” of case-by-case sui generis deter-
minations, on the other.19 Cardozo suggests that we embrace logic, history, 
custom, and sociology in judicial process to stay this course.20 But his point 
can be taken more abstractly: those who clamor for more certainty are sure 
 
 13.  Merges and Duffy trace this tension back to Aristotle. ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 4 (7th ed. 2016). 
 14.  Waxman, supra note 2, at 225. 
 15.  Obviously, this is a simplified view of a very complicated process. For a more nuanced take on 
patents as assets, see Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem 
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 297 (2010). See also ROBIN FELDMAN, 
RETHINKING PATENT LAW 50–74 (2012) (explaining how patents can be used to commercialize the in-
ventions they protect through a bargaining process).  
 16.  BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 2, n.3 (1924). 
 17.  CARDOZO, supra note 16, at 45 (quoting John C. H. Wu, Juristic Philosophy of Mr. Justice 
Holmes, 21 MICH. L. REV. 523, 530 (1923)). 
 18.  CARDOZO, supra note 16, at 44–45.  
 19.  CARDOZO, supra note 16, at 54–55. 
 20.  CARDOZO, supra note 16, at 62. 
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to regret the lack of flexibility when it suits them, and those who bargain for 
vagueness will definitely dream wistfully of bright-line rules. Each has its 
place in the law generally, and in patent law in particular. 
One useful frame for untangling the patent law puzzle has been labeled 
by psychologists as “approach-avoidance conflict,” where subjects are torn 
between a reward and a punishment such that they become immobilized 
when facing the two together (for example, rats might vacillate between ap-
proaching and avoiding a combination of food and shock).21 In his book, 
Incognito: The Secret Lives of Brains, popular neuroscientist David Eagle-
man points to this particular kind of experiment to explain how these poor 
“perplexed rats” parallel the conflict going on in our brains.22 In the rats, two 
systems are fighting to manage one goal: the rat’s behavior. In humans, our 
brains might be comprised of multiple conflicting systems, but economists 
have used a dual process model that works as well as any for conceptual 
framing.23 In this model, human brains labor under a conflict between a ra-
tional system and an emotional one.24 Just as Cardozo sets law between two 
extremes of rigidity and flexibility, so, too, human brains might navigate life 
between extremes of ration and emotion in overall decision-making. The 
neuroscience of all of this is poorly understood, but the perplexed rats (and 
humans) struggling with conflicting values are very real. The particular per-
plexing problem of patent law is that it forces decision-makers (courts, but 
also Congress and the USPTO) to balance not just stability and progress in 
the law, but as Waxman notes, the benefits to the public from patenting gen-
erally (technological progress and innovation) and the resultant loss of com-
petition.25 
But patent law also must contend with the changing nature of technol-
ogy itself. As technology moves incrementally forward, the legal mecha-
nisms that we rely upon to determine patent subject matter eligibility, nov-
elty, non-obviousness, direct infringement and secondary liability, 
 
 21.  See, e.g., Neal E. Miller, Experimental Studies of Conflict, in PERSONALITY AND THE 
BEHAVIOR DISORDERS 431, 436–441 (Joseph McV. Hunt ed., 1944); see generally Eliot Hearst, Oscilla-
tory Behavior During Approach-Avoidance Conflict, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 75, 75–84 
(1967).  
 22.  DAVID EAGLEMAN, INCOGNITO: THE SECRET LIVES OF BRAINS 109 (2011). 
 23.  EAGLEMAN, supra note 22, at 109.  
 24.  This is also the premise behind many aspects of modern behavioral law and economics, includ-
ing the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Kahneman won the Nobel Prize for Economic 
Sciences in 2002 for this body of work. In his latest book, Kahneman describes human brain decision-
making as using two systems, one fast, unconscious and emotional, the other slow, conscious, and delib-
erative. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).  
 25.  Waxman, supra note 2, at 219. 
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equivalents infringement, and so on, necessarily must solve problems today 
yet remain open to accommodate things invented tomorrow.26 
All of this conflict makes for “interesting times,” to be sure, but some 
might say times have always been interesting in patent law. 1982 marks the 
beginning of the modern era, when Congress, after long consideration on 
reducing the dockets generally of circuit courts, created the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit to take on all appeals of patent cases (notably not just 
patent issues).27 The experiment in a specialized court of appeals held out 
great promise for an expertise court that might chase the elusive certainty in 
patent law. As the court matured, the Supreme Court left it to its growth 
spurts, choosing to intervene in cases procedural in nature, not substantive.28 
Enter baseball. Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game, Mi-
chael Lewis’s 2004 bestselling book, tells the story of Billy Beane, the Oak-
land Athletics’ General Manager, who used vast amounts of data to acquire 
undervalued players for his low payroll team to gain an advantage over 
wealthier teams relying on instinct and intuition, the values long utilized by 
traditional baseball scouts.29 Oakland’s success was modest but compel-
ling—when packaged into Lewis’s intense narrative centered on Beane, 
 
 26.  Technology may change in important but disruptive ways, which introduces even more legal 
complexity. See Jack Wroldsen, Creative Destructive Legal Conflict: Lawyers as Disruption Framers in 
Entrepreneurship, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 733, 734 (2016). 
 27.  Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. 
REV. 1, 3–4 (1989) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Case Study]. 
 28.  Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court-and 
Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 792 (2010) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Learning]. Even in reference to 
recent cases, Paul Gugliuzza has described the Court’s docket as comprising cases in “with at least one 
of the following characteristics: (1) the case involves what might be called a ‘transsubstantive’ issue, that 
is, an issue that arises in all types of federal litigation, not just patent cases, such as issues of jurisdiction, 
procedure, and remedies; (2) the case presents the opportunity draw on or harmonize patent law with 
other areas of federal law; or (3) the case requires the Court to interpret a discrete provision of the patent 
statute.” Paul R. Gugliuzza, How Much Has the Supreme Court Changed Patent Law?, 16 CHI.-KENT J. 
INTELL. PROP. 330, 334–35 (2017). Importantly, Gugliuzza notes, the Court doesn’t generally decide 
“foundational” patent law cases. Id. 
 29.  MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2004). Sabermetrics, 
the field of baseball statistics, had been around long before Lewis’s book made it a pop culture reference. 
The Society for American Baseball Research (SABR) was founded in 1971, but it wasn’t until the early 
1980s that computers came along enough to be valuable for analysts. Richard Schell, SABR, Baseball 
Statistics, and Computing: The Last Forty Years, BASEBALL RESEARCH JOURNAL, (Oct. 2011), 
http://sabr.org/research/sabr-baseball-statistics-and-computing-last-forty-years (last visited Mar. 28, 
2018). The term “sabermetrics” was coined by Bill James, author of BASEBALL ABSTRACT: FEATURING 
18 CATEGORIES OF STATISTICAL INFORMATION THAT YOU JUST CAN’T FIND ANYWHERE ELSE, an annual 
compilation recognized as the bible of baseball statistics. See Ben McGrath, The Professor of Baseball, 
NEW YORKER (July 14, 2003), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/07/14/the-professor-of-base-
ball (last visited Mar. 3, 2018). The term is an acronym for SABR and, according to James, “denotes ‘the 
search for objective knowledge about baseball.’” Id.  
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“moneyball” became a well-known management style, in baseball and else-
where.30 
By 2016, baseball analysts long had realized that moneyball analytics, 
now used by all of the professional teams, could provide no substantial com-
petitive advantage.31 Yet, five years into moneyball guru Theo Epstein’s ex-
ecutive reign as President of Baseball Operations for the Chicago Cubs, those 
lovable losers won the 2016 World Series.32 Epstein recently acknowledged 
that he replaced a narrow focus on sabermetrics with a broader, human-cen-
tric approach to the game that analyzes both a player’s statistics and his char-
acter.33 The latter requires instinct and intuition to assess, the same sort of 
old-school value eschewed by Beane and moneyball purists. Cubs manager, 
Joe Maddon, described this new twist on monyeball as “a balance between 
the sabermetric world and the real world. These are human beings and not 
computers.”34 
Moneyball’s compelling account of Billy Beane’s obsession with “re-
lentless analytics” in baseball management and his David-like ability to slay 
Goliath teams with money to spend despite low rates of return on intuition 
and instinct made for a great book (and movie) plot.35 But Beane’s teams 
never really hit the high marks required to define success in professional 
 
 30.  Kevin Grier & Tyler Cowen, The Economics of Moneyball, GRANTLAND, http://grant-
land.com/features/the-economics-moneyball (last visited Mar. 28, 2018) (in baseball); Richard H. Thaler 
& Cass R. Sunstein, Who’s On First, THE NEW REPUBLIC, (Sept. 1, 2003), https://newrepublic.com/arti-
cle/61123/whos-first (in labor markets); Cass Sunstein, Regulatory Moneyball: What Washington Can 
Learn from Sports Geeks, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-
03-27/regulatory-moneyball (in government regulation); Michael J. Gaynor, Can Big Data Predict Which 
Bills Will Pass Congress?, WASH. POST, (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/mag-
azine/can-big-data-predict-which-bills-will-pass-congress/2018/01/31/ffe6c162-f7c3-11e7-b34a-
b85626af34ef_story.html?utm_term=.ae9fb760374b (in legislation). 
 31.  Indeed, the Yankees and the Red Sox had been using sabermetrics before Oakland. See St. John, 
Allen, Powered By Bill James And Friends, The Red Sox Win (Another) Moneyball World Series, FORBES, 
(Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allenstjohn/%202013/10/31/powered-by-bill-james-and-
friends-the-red-sox-win-another-moneyball-world-series/#19d988297c64 (last visited Mar. 28, 2018).  
 32.  Speaking of curses, the Cubs championship win in 2016 broke the most infamous curse in 
baseball, the Curse of the Billy Goat. See Laura Wagner, Cubs’ Curse of the Billy Goat and Other Super-
stitious Sports Tales, NPR, (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2015/10/21/448719944/cubs-curse-of-the-billy-goat-and-other-superstitious-sports-tales (last vis-
ited Mar. 24, 2018). 
 33.  Theo Epstein at Yale Class Day: “Choose to Keep Your Heads Up,” TIME, (May 22, 2017), 
http://time.com/4787640/theo-epstein-cubs-yale-graduation-commencement/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).  
 34.  Bill Pennington, Cubs’ Theo Epstein is Making Lightning Strike Twice, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 28, 
2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/sports/baseball/theo-epstein-chicago-cubs-boston-red-sox-
world-series.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2018). 
 35.  Columbia Pictures released a movie in 2011 based upon the book, starring Brad Pitt as Billy 
Beane. MONEYBALL (Columbia Pictures 2011). 
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baseball—playoff wins and championships.36 Beane could expect to win a 
lot of games (and win games more than Oakland had ever won before), but 
the quantitative data analysis could only take them so far. Treating players 
like computers failed to live up to the hype in Oakland. 
When Ben Lindbergh and Sam Miller, a couple of data analysts from 
the FiveThirtyEight blog,37 tried to apply moneyball management to the 
Sonoma Stompers, a minor league team with a much lower budget than ma-
jor league teams like the Oakland A’s, their “smart spreadsheet” approach 
also failed to generate much success.38 They observed that their player-man-
ager couldn’t get on board with changing how he utilized critical pieces of 
the team and that the players didn’t buy into the hard data on their particular 
advantages or disadvantages. Importantly, Lindbergh and Miller noticed that 
the vast amounts of data that they collected and crunched about players 
didn’t produce one valuable piece of information: whether the player could 
or would improve (sometimes known as “coachability”).39 
Our first two decades with the Federal Circuit taught us a lot about spe-
cialized appellate courts (more on that below) and how developed expertise 
can be indispensable in patent law.40 Without any meaningful oversight, 
however, it fell into the same traps as the A’s and the Stompers—the Federal 
Circuit failed to see that subjective inputs like generalized legal standards or 
common sense safeguards should play a role alongside its technical and pa-
tent expertise to better tackle the balancing acts of patent law. Like quantita-
tive analysts who become surprised when human nature intervenes in unpre-
dictable ways with “smart spreadsheets,”41 the Federal Circuit’s testing by 
the Supreme Court might have been somewhat surprising after so long, but 
in hindsight, the recent high rate of review might be a feature, rather than a 
bug, of conflicting systems working always toward some equipoise. The lin-
gering question, then, is how much and what kind of intervention? Once pa-
tent law accepts it must keep balancing these several values for eternity, how 
 
 36.  See DAVID PERKING, FIVE- PLUS TOOLS: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF BASEBALL 
THROUGHOUT THE EYES OF A SCOUT 215 (2014). 
 37.  Nate Silver’s FiveThirtyEight blog uses statistical analysis to tell compelling stories about elec-
tions, politics, sports, science, economics and lifestyle. See generally FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, www.fivethir-
tyeight.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2018). 
 38.  BEN LINDBERGH & SAM MILLER, THE ONLY RULE IS IT HAS TO WORK: OUR WILD 
EXPERIMENT BUILDING A NEW KIND OF BASEBALL TEAM 55 (BASEBALL TEAM (First ed. 2016). 
 39.  Michael Schrage, What A Minor League Moneyball Reveals About Predictive Analysis, 
HARVARD BUS. REV., https://hbr.org/2016/05/what-a-minor-league-moneyball-reveals-about-predictive-
analytics (last visited Mar. 24, 2018); see generally LINDBERGH & MILLER, supra note 38. 
 40.  Dreyfuss, Learning, supra note 28, at 797; see also Dreyfuss, Case Study, supra note 27, at 24–
25. 
 41.  LINDBERGH & MILLER, supra note 38, at 337. 
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should it operate to minimize disruption and maximize growth? Is it coach-
able? 
II. ON RIVALS AND RELATIONSHIPS 
At the 1860 Republican convention in Chicago, Abraham Lincoln’s 
chances seemed slim—William Seward, Salmon P. Chase, and Edward 
Bates were just three among almost a dozen statesmen vying for the nomi-
nation.42 Thanks to some political maneuvering, Lincoln got the nomination 
on the third ballot and went on to a general election victory.43 He decided 
quickly that all three former rivals, along with some Democrats and South-
erners for good measure, should be placed on his cabinet to “stitch[] together 
the various factions of the Republican Party.”44 Goodwin’s book tells a rosy 
tale of cooperation among former rivals, each with a large personality and 
principled arguments often at odds with Lincoln (although, in reality, per-
haps the situation nationally was more grim).45 The Civil War presented a 
unique scenario that brought all Americans to a breaking point, so it may be 
no surprise that a common goal to maintain the Union at all cost would knit 
these principals together in some fashion. 
In Incognito, Eagleman proposes that the brain is best understood as a 
team of rivals, turning Doris Kearns Goodwin’s aphorism about President 
Lincoln’s cabinet into a pithy description of the complex processes behind 
human behavior.46 Lincoln wanted to turn his adversaries from the Republi-
can nominating convention into allies for the common goals of his admin-
istration—namely, to keep the country from falling apart.47 Mapping this 
messy real life example to human decision-making, Eagleman suggests that 
our brains have similar factions competing for the same goal of survival.48 
Multiple systems converge to solve similar problems, often in overlapping 
and rivalrous ways that serve a biological advantage.49 
Eagleman repackages the brain as a set of rivalrous systems working on 
the same task in overlapping and multi-nodal ways.50 Patent cases and the 
 
 42.  DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
240–243 (Simon & Shuster Paperbacks ed. 2012). 
 43.  GOODWIN, supra note 42, at 249. 
 44.  GOODWIN, supra note 42, at 283 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  EAGLEMAN, supra note 22, at 109. 
 47.  GOODWIN, supra note 42, at 280, 318. 
 48.  EAGLEMAN, supra note 22, at 109. 
 49.  EAGLEMAN, supra note 22, at 147. 
 50.  EAGLEMAN, supra note 22, at 110. 
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development of patent law over time and by various institutions present an-
other messy real-life example. These institutions all claim to desire to pro-
mote innovation, but they approach this goal with different perspectives and 
processes. A team of rivals account is a relational one, and the critical rela-
tionship in patent law right now (and the one highlighted most by Waxman) 
is the relationship between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court. As 
for Seward and Lincoln, who became close friends and companions until 
Lincoln’s death, optimism abounds.51 
The establishment of the Federal Circuit to alleviate circuit court docket 
load was not without known risks, including tunnel vision, isolation, and 
boundary problems with the other appellate courts.52 Between Congress and 
early procedural cases in the Supreme Court, these risks appeared to have 
been mitigated through semi-specialization (the Federal Circuit hears all pa-
tent appeals but has a rich docket of other cases from the Court of Claims, 
veterans, and the like)53 and case jurisdiction, which affords some benefit, 
described by Dreyfuss as “a somewhat broader perspective on innovation 
policy, while also creating an interchange with other national courts.”54 
After an initial two decades of light touch, though, the Supreme Court 
embarked on the frenetic pace of review and reversal highlighted by Wax-
man.55 Dreyfuss argues that this heightened level of review should not be 
taken as a criticism, but that the two courts “have a great deal to learn from 
one another.”56 In his remarks in this Journal last year, Judge Timothy Dyk, 
a member of the Federal Circuit, likewise positively noted that the Supreme 
Court’s intense engagement with patent law of late was beneficial to his 
court.57 Others are less cheerful. In response to Judge Dyk, Professor Tim 
Holbrook refers to the recent cases as “a mixed bag,” with the Court’s deci-
sions on patent eligible subject matter “hav[ing] simply gone off the rails.”58 
 
 51.  See GOODWIN, supra note 42, at 745 (quoting John Hay, Lincoln’s secretary, as observing, 
“The history of governments . . . affords few instances of an official connection hallowed by a friendship 
so absolute and sincere as that which existed between these two magnanimous spirits . . . .”). 
 52.  Dreyfuss, Learning, supra note 28, at 790. 
 53.  Id.; see also Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 333 (2017); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal 
Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1461–64 (2012). 
 54.  Dreyfuss, Learning, supra note 28, at 791. 
 55.  Waxman, supra note 2, at 219. 
 56.  Dreyfuss, Learning, supra note 28, at 793. 
 57.  Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship Between the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 67, 71 (2016). 
 58.  Timothy R. Holbrook, Is the Supreme Court Concerned with Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, 
or Both: A Response to Judge Timothy B. Dyk, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 313, 319 (2017). 
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Former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul Michel has argued previously that 
the Supreme Court “doesn’t really understand the case law.”59 
In the midst of this continuing conversation (the Court will decide two 
cases later this year from the October 2017 term),60 Waxman frames the Rob-
erts Court’s patent law jurisprudence as a reaction of sorts to the Federal 
Circuit’s caselaw. He refers to a “new mindset” skeptical of the lower court’s 
work in the area of patent law, with the Supreme Court having “a greater 
willingness to second guess the Federal Circuit.” What if, instead, we 
thought of the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court not as two discon-
nected institutions, but related ones that seek to balance values and serve a 
single innovation goal? 
Like the rational system in our brains and sabermetrics in baseball’s 
front offices, the Federal Circuit sits uniquely situated to bring its expertise 
in patent law and technology interfacing to influence both trial court practice 
and procedure in patent cases and substantive patent law doctrines.61 We 
should not fault the court for keeping to its task commendably. In doctrinal 
patent law cases like KSR,62 Myriad,63 and Festo,64 the Federal Circuit’s de-
cisions reflect a court that spends much of its time considering how patent 
law cases are tried in lower courts, how technology influences decisions in 
this space, and how best to promote innovation while adhering to statutory 
and precedential constraints.65 It is also possible that the Federal Circuit’s 
former rules were designed specifically for the USPTO, which has an exam-
iner corps making patentability decisions on thousands of applications annu-
ally.66 In the early days of the Federal Circuit, this may have seemed like 
 
 59.  Paul Michel, Lecture: Innovation, Incentives, Competition, and Patent Law Reform: Should 
Congress Fix the Patent Office and Leave Litigation Management to the Courts?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1135 (2010); Greg Reilly, How Can the Supreme Court Not “Understand” 
Patent Law?, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 292, 298 (2017). 
 60.  Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 639 Fed. Appx. 639 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (U.S. June 21, 1992 (No. 16-712); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC, 
825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, SAS Institute, Inc. v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (U.S. May 22, 
2017) (No. 16-969). 
 61.  Dyk, supra note 57, at 82. 
 62.  See generally KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (finding too rigid the Federal 
Circuit’s rule for determining whether a skilled artisan had motivation to combine references).  
 63.  See generally Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) 
(declaring isolated genetic sequences not eligible for patenting).  
 64.  See generally Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) 
(finding too exclusive the Federal Circuit’s rule for determining equivalent based on prosecution history). 
 65.  Dreyfuss, Learning, supra note 28, at 806. 
 66.  Although it should have been obvious, I’m grateful to Paul Gugliuzza for pointing this out.  
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enough of a start to move beyond the chaotic appeals process and lack of 
uniformity that spurred creation of the expert court in the first place.67 
Over time, like Billy Bean’s relentless analytics or the mythical per-
fectly rational actor, the expertise of the Federal Circuit, without meaningful 
review, began to seem one-sided and self-perpetuating.68 By creating a spe-
cialized court at the intermediate level, Congress created a court with a great 
deal of power over lower courts yet still overseen by the Supreme Court in 
the same manner as the other circuit courts. It was only a matter of time 
before the Supreme Court (maybe pushed by the patent bar, as Waxman 
hints) decides to examine Federal Circuit rules like the Seagate test for will-
ful infringement,69 Octane Fitness’s test for an exceptional patent case war-
ranting fee shifting,70 or even KSR’s rules for determining non-obvious-
ness.71 Moreover, as others have noted, the majority of the Supreme Court’s 
cases, even at this heightened pace, involve very few questions of founda-
tional patent law, they instead focus on statutory interpretation, harmoniza-
tion of patent law with other areas of the law, and common federal litigation 
problems.72 
The Supreme Court, a generalized Court of last resort with control, for 
the most part, over its own docket, faces a very different task in its working 
day.73 Judge Frank Easterbrook refers to it as “a regulator.”74 Professor Geoff 
Stone agrees in a sense, describing the court’s role as one to “not merely 
decide the specific dispute between Joe and Mary, but to enunciate principles 
 
 67.  Dreyfuss, Learning, supra note 28, at 801. 
 68.  Indeed, as Holbrook has pointed out, the few cases during this era may have even facilitated 
the formalism that the Federal Circuit appeared to employ. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s 
Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 2–6 (2003). 
Gugliuzza notes that the Federal Circuit may create doctrines to bolster its own position as an expert, to 
the exclusion of other institutions, including the USPTO. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Saving the Federal Circuit, 
13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 350, 370 (2014). 
 69.  Halo Elec., Inc. v. Pulse Elec., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s 
test for treble damages as overly rigid).  
 70.  Octane Fitness, LLC. v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1751 (2014) (rejecting 
the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 285 to determine an exceptional case for awarding 
attorney’s fees in patent cases); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 
1745 (2014) (holding that the appellate court should use an abuse of discretion standard when applying 
35 U.S.C. § 285 to determine an exceptional case). 
 71.  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 426 (2007). 
 72.  Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 334–336 (2017). 
 73.  See generally Frederick Schauer, Is it Important to Be Important: Evaluating the Supreme 
Court’s Case-Selection Process, 119 YALE LAW J. ONLINE 77 (2010) (generally evaluating the Supreme 
Court’s case-selection process). 
 74.  Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1984). 
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of law.”75 Over the course of its history, the Court has built up its own ex-
pertise in the areas of constitutional law, statutory interpretation, and other 
generalized legal questions of great importance.76 It’s reasonable to assume 
that the Court might disagree with the Federal Circuit in application of rules, 
principles, and precedent in patent law, as reasonable minds might disagree 
in garden-variety disputes or as the Supreme Court and the 9th Circuit might 
disagree in non-patent cases. 
That these disagreements impact innovation and incentives by dimin-
ishing certainty and predictability for future inventors and patent owners pre-
sents a plausible basis for fretting over the Court’s interest in tinkering with 
the expertise of the Federal Circuit. But the Federal Circuit’s own business 
of patent law in the appellate trenches (not to mention trial courts and prac-
titioners advising clients) need not be roiled by any of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions of late. Lincoln spent months debating emancipation with his cab-
inet of rivals and all of those involved worried that the war would be unend-
ing.77 But it was Lincoln that ultimately made the decision to emancipate the 
slaves, calling his Cabinet together and informing them about the decision, 
and importantly, inviting them to offer input on execution. When Seward 
advised that he wait until victory to issue the proclamation, Lincoln did wait 
until Antietam to issue it, reflecting the importance of good relations even 
when disagreements arise.78 
To work well as cooperative rivals, the institutions themselves must do 
the hard work of putting aside their differences and focusing on their separate 
expertise as applied to the innovation goals we’ve set for the patent system. 
Advising clients remains difficult, but that is a function of the dynamic na-
ture of common law adjudication itself. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
wisely and wryly wrote, “[T]he means do not exist for determinations that 
shall be good for all time.”79 Waxman makes an excellent point about the 
changes coming too fast and too furious these days for many of us to keep 
up, but the better correction is not to eliminate one or the other of these in-
stitutions, but to foster better dialogue and cooperation between them. As-
suming patent law, writ large, generates innovation and economic growth in 
ways that “promote progress,” the devil (as always) resides in the details and 
 
 75.  Geoffrey R. Stone, Chief Justice Roberts and the Role of the Supreme Court, HUFF. POST, (Feb. 
2, 2007), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/chief-justice-roberts-and_b_40277.html (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2018). 
 76.  Schauer, supra note 73, at 78. 
 77.  GOODWIN, supra note 42, at 464–468.  
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 998 (1997). 
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in the work of many institutions, not just the Federal Circuit and the Supreme 
Court, including Congress, the USPTO, and district courts across the coun-
try. 
Some attention should be paid to the role that technology plays in patent 
law, which impacts the relationships here. Part of the appeal of a specialized 
Federal Circuit having a final say on patent cases remains its willingness to 
tackle head on complex technological disputes.80 But the real workhorses in 
patent disputes are trial courts on the ground, who labor to combine the cog-
nitive load of understanding a complex area of the law and achieving some 
level of competence with a complex technology.81 The Federal Circuit does 
have a few judges with technical backgrounds,82 but query how useful these 
backgrounds are when the invention in dispute is far afield from those subject 
areas. There is no reason to believe that we should be less confident in the 
Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court over time based on technological back-
ground alone. The cases that make it to the Supreme Court often don’t in-
volve disputes as to technological facts,83 and, in any event, the latest cases 
don’t seem to implicate complicated technology, if judged on complexity of 
the patent claims alone. Alice or Akamai might be exceptions to this gener-
alization,84 but in both of those cases, the Federal Circuit and the Supreme 
Court capably described the technology well enough to present the legal is-
sues for resolution. 
The expertise of the Federal Circuit really lies in its understanding of 
how patent law works in practice—the moving parts associated with exami-
nation, appeals to the USPTO, district court practice, and its own appellate 
 
 80.  See generally R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Em-
pirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004).   
 81.  See Judge James F. Holderman & Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation Predicament in the 
United States, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 1–4 (2007). To be fair, there are disputes involving 
technology not very complex in any sense of the word. I once litigated the gusseted feature in expandable 
luggage.  
 82  See Judges, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges (last 
visited Mar.24, 2018) (For instance, Judge Chen, Judge Linn and Judge Stoll have B.S. degrees in Elec-
trical Engineering, Judge Lourie has a Ph.D. in Chemistry, and Judge Moore has B.S. and M.S. degrees 
in Electrical Engineering). The court also hires technical assistants to aid in its decisions, and often the 
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 83.  Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 338, 346. 
 84.  Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) (invalidating claims directed to a 
computer-driven escrow service); Limelight Networks v. Akamai Tech., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2114 (2014) 
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jurisdiction.85 Several of the cases reversed by the Supreme Court could be 
classified as cases where the Federal Circuit has created a bright-line rule 
that serves the value of predictability in the lower courts and on the front 
lines at the USPTO.86 If the Federal Circuit had been more clear about why 
it assigns this or that practical rule for patent case management—willful in-
fringement, exceptional cases, and the like—then the Supreme Court’s ap-
proach in review would almost certainly take this into account. 
As Waxman argues that the Supreme Court has engaged in a “devaluing 
of context” problem for the Federal Circuit, he appears to mean that the 
Court, in its recent jurisprudence, adheres to its own rules of precedent and 
interpretation, but tends to ignore long-standing historical context that 
shaped the Federal Circuit decisions in this space.87 Waxman uses Kimble as 
an example of the Court preferring to keep a settled rule in place rather than 
“upset the incentives for investment” by chasing the right rule of law. His 
point would be even stronger to contrast Kimble to another recent case, Im-
pression Products, where the Court shuttered the Federal Circuit’s long-
standing rule.88 In Kimble, considered a patent misuse case but procedurally 
a contract case, the Court relied on stare decisis to keep in place a long-ques-
tioned mode of rendering royalty provisions in patent license agreements un-
enforceable after the expiration of the patent.89 In Impression Products, the 
Court overruled directly Mallinckrodt, a 1992 case affirmed repeatedly at the 
Federal Circuit despite criticism along the same lines as that of post-expira-
tion royalties.90 One might wonder why a long-standing Federal Circuit rule 
would not be afforded the same deference as an oft-slighted Warren Court 
one? 
But this is another feature of the perspective, function, and relationship 
of the courts themselves. Where the Federal Circuit might miss the forest for 
the trees of patent law, the Supreme Court might miss the trees for the forest 
 
 85.  R. Polk Wagner, The Two Federal Circuits, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 785, 789 (2010) (describing 
the Federal Circuit as serving two functions related to patent law—determining whether cases have been 
decided correctly and being a “steward of the law,” to ensure stable and predictable patent law over time).   
 86.  See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes 
of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 802–804 (2008). In several works about the Federal Circuit, Drey-
fuss explains how the early Federal Circuit maximized its technical expertise in patent cases by declaring 
some issues questions of law. Id.  
 87.  Waxman, supra note 2, at 222. 
 88.  Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1535 (2017) (declaring a re-
striction on a sale unenforceable in patent law when the sale has been made by a patentee or a licensee 
operating within the confines of his license). By citing throughout Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec-
tronics, Inc., the Court suggests that Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt, and the Federal Circuit, in not rec-
ognizing such, continued to rely on Mallinckrodt as precedent in Impression Products.  
 89.  Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2301 (2015). 
 90.  Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated by Impression 
Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).  
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of generalized law. In this way, it is less alarming (and almost comforting) 
that they have each other to rely upon to ensure that patent law is right-sized 
for innovation goals. Billy Beane’s strategy to examine the micro-detail of 
his players’ performance on the field will not achieve the highest levels of 
success without folding in the emotional intelligence and soft skills that Theo 
Epstein has learned to look for in assessing humans along with their statis-
tics. But as with value tradeoffs like these, so, too, the competitive, rivalrous 
nature of these mechanisms in place might fuel the fire of innovation policy 
over the long term. Fretting over the rapid changes seems a bit like worrying 
over the lightning pace of technology in general. If we accept that technology 
moves quickly, it’s hard to find the right ways to slow the pace without slow-
ing the innovation we desire—so, too, with patent law. Welcoming the 
(maybe hopeful) idea that the Supreme Court is engaging with patent law in 
a meaningful way, I’d like to shift the conversation away from the sky falling 
and toward future examinations of cognitive load and expertise tradeoffs, so 
that we can learn more about how the relationship between the Federal Cir-
cuit and the Supreme Court facilitates legal development—they can be Sew-
ards of patent law together. 
Moreover, I disagree with Waxman about the significance of lopsided 
opinions. The unanimity of the Supreme Court’s cases need not add more 
gloom and doom.91 Chief Justice Roberts self-identifies as a consensus 
builder on the Court.92 Unanimous or less contentious decisions have been 
par for the course in most Roberts Courts cases, rather than some outlier for 
patent disputes. As it tries to reach consensus in more cases, the Court nar-
rows its outcomes and slices older cases into smaller and smaller bites, dis-
tinguishing and distancing when possible.93 Counter-intuitively, this may 
open the door more widely to the Federal Circuit to establish its own law and 
policy in these particular spaces, rather than telling some bigger story about 
dominance and power. 
Another set of relationships of increasing importance to patent law lies 
within the Federal Circuit. Eight of eighteen judges have been appointed to 
the Federal Circuit since 2005, the opening year of the Roberts Court. The 
court has six judges with extensive patent law experience prior to their ap-
pointment to the bench, and twelve who have some patent law, civil and ap-
pellate, or international trade expertise in addition to general administrative 
 
 91.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. 
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or appellate experience.94 Coinciding with the higher number of reviews by 
the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit appears to be developing factions. 
Bilski, the patent eligibility case, had one concurrence and three dissents.95 
Alice, on a similar question, was decided by a plurality, with three dissents-
in-part and some “reflections” from former Chief Judge Randall Rader.96 Ak-
amai, an important case about multi-actor infringement, included a blistering 
dissent from Judge Bryson and Lexmark included one from Judge Dyk. Like 
a circuit split between other circuits, dissent within the Federal Circuit may 
serve as a regulating force that pushes both majority and dissenting groups 
to be more careful in drafting opinions such that positions and policy are 
delineated clearly.97 
Finally, the other dramatis personae in patent law cannot be ignored to 
focus solely on the relationship between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme 
Court. Waxman hints at the Supreme Court’s skepticism toward Congress 
and the USPTO and at Congress’s silence as a tacit acceptance of Federal 
Circuit policy.98 Equally plausible, many different stakeholders might lobby 
Congress for reform or to prevent reform, including repeat patent litigation 
players who are often both patent plaintiffs and defendants. (Less gener-
ously, Congress’s extreme dysfunction could be to blame.99) 
The USPTO, on the other hand, is the executive agency that examines 
applications, tries appeals, and administers post-grant and inter partes re-
views. It takes its task as an examining and technical agency seriously, but 
inevitably its means for achieving the ends of a happy and healthy innovation 
system will look and feel very differently from the courts or Congress. Post-
grant reviews and inter partes reviews, added by the America Invents Act in 
2011 to the agency’s ability to review issued patents using its Patent Trials 
and Appeals Board, have much to commend them with respect to shifting 
technical assessment back to the USPTO after grant and allowing for some 
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adversarial participation in that process for less expense and time than litiga-
tion.100 In the past five years, the invalidation rates have been markedly high 
and some worry that the benefits over litigation may be overstated.101 The 
Supreme Court will review the constitutionality of these reviews proceeding 
without Article III judges during this term.102 If they remain intact, they will 
continue to provide yet another avenue for institutional balancing of patent 
values like certainty and growth. 
Given these exciting times and the dizzying pace of technology, opti-
mism springs eternal that differing groups are up to the challenge of embrac-
ing value conflict within patent law and adapting itself to the goal of innova-
tion. With the Supreme Court in the position to provide important oversight 
and generalized legal expertise, the Federal Circuit can continue to raise its 
voice to technical and patent law expertise, while district courts remain in 
the trenches doing the critical day-to-day work of resolving private patent 
disputes. With more guidance from these appellate courts as to precise policy 
drivers when bright line rules are disfavored, we should be able to have some 
confidence that, over time, the complexity underlying patent law’s balancing 
act will be the key to a robust and enduring legacy of innovation. 
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